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/VOT 
DISSENT OF COMMISSIONER J. CLAY SMITH, JR., ON THE 
APPROVAL FOR LITIGATION OF THE CASE OF DARLENE 
BARTEK v. THE KENT UPHOLSTERY CO., INC., ON THE 
ISSUE OF SUCCESSOR COl-WANY LIABILITY 
.. 
On Ju1yla, 1980, the General Counsel sought this Commission's 
approval for litigation of a case entitled, Darlene Bartex v. 
The Kent Upholstery Co., Inc. Bartex was a sex discrimination 
case in which the alleged act of discrimination occurred at a 
time in' which the Kent Upholstery Co., Inc., was not owned by 
the present owners. The proposed suit, however, was brought 
solely against Kent Upholstery, Inc. 
Upon query as to whether or not the present owners of the 
defendant company had continued the acts of discrimination which 
were commenced by its previous owners, it was indicated that no 
consideration had been given to that issue. 
Since the legal issue of successor liability was not 
! 
presented to the Commission for evaluation before litigation 
* against respondent was approved by the majority for litigation, 
I dissented for the following reasons: 
Courts have long held that a successor company is liable 
for acts of discrimination committed by its predecessor only 
when certain standards are met. Those standards were articulated 
by the Sixth Circuit in EEOC v. MacMi 11an B lo"e'de 1" 'Conta"iriers', 'Inc., 
503 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1974), and by the Ninth Circuit in 
Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975). 
* After the Commission meeting, staff from the General Counsel's 
Office,aindicated that the previous owners may be joined in the 
suit ~en filed in court. 
DISSENT - 2 
In Macl1illan and Slack the Courts of Appeals held that 
the following criteria must be met in order for a successor 
company to be h~ld liable for discriminatory acts of its 
l 
predecessor: (~) whether the successor company had notice of 
the charge; (2) the ability of the predecessor to provide relief; 
(3) whether there has been a substantial continuity of business 
operations; (4) whether the new employer uses the same plant; 
(5) whether he uses the same or substantially the same workforce; 
(6) whether he uses the same or substantially the same supervisory 
personnel; (7) whether the same jobs exist under substantially the 
same working conditions; (8) whether he uses the same machinery, 
equipment and methods of production; and (9) whether he produces 
the same product. 
Under the facts presented, since these factors were not 
presented to the Commission for its evaluation, there is a great 
, 
possibility that it has authorized enforcement action against the 
wrong party. Hence, I respectfully dissent. 
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